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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal, involving important legal and societal 
questions, arises out of an attack on the legality of the 
Pennsylvania Attendant Care Services Act (Care Act), 62 P.S. § 
3051 et seq. (Supp. 1994).  Pennsylvania enacted this legislation 
in 1986 as a program designed to enable physically disabled 
persons to live in their homes rather than institutions and, when 
possible, to become active and useful members of society.   
 The plaintiffs, Tracey Easley (Easley) and Florence 
Howard (Howard), both rejected as ineligible for the program, 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Care Act conflicts 
with the more recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA or Act), 42 U.S.C.A. 12101 et seq. (Supp. 1994),1  
because the Care Act requires that candidates for the program 
also be mentally alert.  Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State of 
Pennsylvania from excluding them from the program.  Following a 
bench trial, the district court concluded that the program 
developed under the Care Act violated the ADA and enjoined the 
                     
1
.  These proceedings assert claims under Title II of the ADA.  
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  This court has jurisdiction as the appeal is from a final 
order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  
State from excluding Easley and Howard from receiving attendant 
care services.  The State appeals.  We reverse. 
  
 I. 
 The Care Act authorized the Pennsylvania Department of 
Public Welfare (PDPW) to provide attendant care services to 
eligible individuals.  The General Assembly declared its purpose 
in enacting the law was to enable physically disabled but 
mentally alert adults between the ages of eighteen and fifty-nine 
to live in their own homes and communities.  Additionally, they 
must: 
 1. experience a physical impairment 
expected to last a continuous 
period of at least 12 months; 
 
 2. be capable of selecting, 
supervising and, if needed, firing 
an attendant; 
 
          3. be capable of managing their own 
financial and legal affairs; and, 
 
          4. because of their physical 
impairment, require assistance to 
complete the functions of daily 
living, self-care, and mobility.   
 
62 P.S. § 3053.  Persons who are physically disabled but not 
mentally alert are excluded from the program. 
  A. Tracey Easley and Florence Howard         
  
  At the time of trial, Easley was a twenty-nine year old 
woman tragically disabled by a catastrophic car accident in 1982, 
just as she was to begin her sophomore year at Vassar College.  
Easley suffered a closed head injury which left her with minimal 
mobility and without speech.  She apparently can communicate with 
her family by blinking her eyes and using other facial 
  
expressions.  Presently, Easley is unable to care for herself and 
cannot be left alone.  Easley is not capable of selecting, 
supervising, or firing an attendant, or managing her own 
financial and legal affairs. 
 In 1987, Easley resided in West Philadelphia, and 
through the use of a surrogate, in this case her mother, applied 
for and received attendant care services from Resources for 
Living Independently (RLI) which was under contract with the 
PDPW.  Easley moved in 1991 to an area not serviced by RLI but by 
Homemaker Services Metropolitan Area, Inc (HSMA), which was also 
under contract with PDPW.   
 At the time of trial plaintiff Howard was a fifty-three 
year old woman with multiple sclerosis and undifferentiated 
schizophrenia.  Howard is immobile from the waist down and, due 
to her condition, cannot live alone.  Howard lived with her 
daughter until September 1991, but entered the Philadelphia 
Nursing Home when her daughter could not obtain attendant care 
services for her. 
 Howard has expressed dissatisfaction with her present 
situation.  She wants to leave the nursing home and live in the 
community.  To do this, she would need PDPW-funded attendant care 
services.  PDPW, however, determined Howard ineligible under the 
Act because she was not mentally alert.  Without using a 
surrogate, Howard is incapable of selecting, supervising or 
discharging an attendant and is not capable of managing her own 
financial and legal affairs. 
  
 Pennsylvania's Attendant Care Program determined the 
plaintiffs to be ineligible for its services because they were 
not capable of hiring, supervising and, if needed, firing an 
attendant and because they are not capable of personally 
controlling their own legal and financial affairs.  Both 
plaintiffs alleged that defendant Karen Snider, Secretary of the 
PDPW, and defendant Kay Arnold, the Deputy Secretary for PDPW's 
Office of Social Programs (OSP) which administers the Attendant 
Care program, violated the ADA by denying them attendant care 
services because they were not "mentally alert."  Easley and 
Howard challenge the provision of the Care Act that requires the 
participants to be mentally alert. 
 B.  THE ATTENDANT CARE PROGRAM 
 The General Assembly stated the policies in pertinent 
part underlying the Care Act were as follows: 
 1. The increased availability of 
attendant care services for adults 
will enable them to live in their 
own homes and communities. 
 
 2. Priority recipients of attendant 
care services under this Act shall 
be those mentally alert but 
severely physically disabled who 
are in the greatest risk of being 
in an institutional setting. 
 
 3. Recipients of attendant care have 
the right to make decisions about, 
direct the provision of and control 
their attendant care services.  
This includes but is not limited to 
hiring, training, managing, paying 
and firing of an attendant. 
 
62 P.S. at § 3052. 
 
  
 The Care Act defines attendant care services as 
"[t]hose basic and ancillary services which enable an individual 
to live in his home and community, rather than in an institution, 
and to carry out functions of daily living, self-care and 
mobility."  Id. at § 3053.  Basic services include assistance  
with getting in and out of bed, a wheelchair, or a car and also 
include assistance with routine bodily functions such as health 
maintenance activities, bathing and personal hygiene, dressing, 
grooming, and feeding.  Id.  Certain ancillary services may be 
provided which include homemaker services such as shopping, 
cleaning and laundry, companion-type services such as 
transportation, letter writing, reading mail, and escort, and 
assistance with cognitive tasks such as managing finances, 
planning activities, and making decisions.  Id. 
 The PDPW contracts with various agencies to provide 
attendant care services pursuant to the Act and Department 
guidelines.  The Department requires that the agencies offer 
three models of service delivery: the consumer model, the agency 
model, and the combination model.  Under the consumer model the 
consumer advertises, interviews, hires, and fires the attendant.  
The consumer submits invoices to the respective agencies and 
receives money so that the consumer is responsible for the task 
of paying the care giver for his or her services.  Under the 
agency model, the agency employs the attendant, but the consumer 
retains the right to reject an attendant that the consumer 
considers unsuitable.  The consumer provides direction in 
developing the service plan and retains the responsibility for 
  
supervising the attendant in the home.  Under the combination 
model, the consumer selects certain tasks to be performed and 
certain tasks the agency will perform.  The consumer has the 
responsibility to choose the service delivery model that he/she 
most prefers.  PDPW describes the combination model as "a menu 
with the consumer selecting what tasks he or she will do and what 
tasks the agency will do." 
  II. 
 We must determine if the targeting of the programmatic  
services to physically disabled but mentally alert individuals is 
permissible or whether the State improperly excluded Easley and 
Howard from receiving attendant care services.  We make this 
determination by examining the essential nature of the program to 
discover whether mental alertness is a necessary eligibility 
requirement and whether Easley and Howard can satisfy this 
requirement with a reasonable modification, here by using a 
surrogate.  In reviewing this appeal, the court exercises a 
plenary standard of review when applying legal precepts to 
undisputed facts.  Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. Philadelphia, 945 
F.2d 667, 671 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1668 
(1992). 
A.  "Mental Alertness" Under The Care Act.  
   We begin our analysis with the passage of the ADA.  
Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination against 
handicapped individuals by extending the non-discrimination 
principles required at institutions receiving federal funds by 
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 790 et seq. (Supp. 1994), 
  
to a much wider array of institutions and businesses, including 
services provided by states and municipalities.  42 U.S.C.A. §  
12101 et seq.  Title II of the ADA provides: 
 
 Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, 
no qualified individual with a disability 
shall by reason of such disability be 
excluded from participation in or be denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity. 
 
Id. at § 12132.            
 The State's reading of the ADA and its supporting 
regulations is one which enables a state to provide a particular 
class of disabled persons with benefits and services without 
obligating itself to extend the same services and benefits to 
other classes of persons with disabilities.  The regulations 
implementing the ADA define a "qualified individual with a 
disability" as: 
 An individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable modifications to rules, 
policies, or practices, . . . meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public 
entity. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993).  Another regulation implementing the 
ADA specifically endorses a state's authority to offer benefits 
to specific classes of persons with disabilities:  
 Nothing in this part prohibits a public 
entity from providing benefits, services, or 
advantages to individuals with disabilities, 
or to a particular class of individuals with 
disabilities beyond those required by this 
part.  
  
 
Id. at § 35.130(c).  Further, the preamble also authorizes a 
state to design programs for particular groups of disabilities.  
The preamble reads in part: 
 State and local governments may provide 
special benefits, beyond those required by 
non-discrimination requirements of this part 
that are limited to individuals with 
disabilities or a particular class of 
individuals with disabilities, without 
incurring additional obligations to other 
classes of persons with disabilities.    
 
App. A., 28 C.F.R. Ch.I Pt 35 (1993).   
 
 The State asserts that in addition to the Care Act's 
consistency with the regulations implementing the ADA, the Care 
Act is consistent with the regulations implementing the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794, the ADA's forerunner.  
These regulations state in part: 
 The exclusion of non-handicapped persons from 
the benefits of a program limited by Federal 
statute or executive order to handicapped 
persons or the exclusion of a specific class  
of handicapped persons from a program limited 
by Federal statute or executive order to a 
different class of handicapped persons is not 
prohibited by this part. 
 
45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (1993) (emphasis added).  
 The district court rejected the State's position and 
accepted the contentions of Easley and Howard that the 
prerequisite of mental alertness is just the sort of 
discrimination that the ADA intended to prevent and concluded 
that such a criterion contravenes the regulations implementing 
  
the Act.  The court relied on an ADA regulation which states in 
relevant part:   
 A public entity shall not impose or apply 
eligibility criteria that screen out or tend 
to screen out an individual with a disability 
or any class of individuals with a disability 
from fully and equally enjoying any service 
program or activity, unless such criteria can 
be shown to be necessary for the provision of 
the service, program, or activity being 
offered. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (emphasis added). 
  The district court refused to accept the State's 
characterization of the program and, in its own examination of 
the essential nature of the program, the court determined that it 
is not necessary to be mentally alert to receive attendant care 
services.  The court did not view consumer control and 
independence as essential elements of the program, but rather 
merely two of the many opportunities the program provides.   
 In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 
397 (1979), the Court first examined § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, the predecessor of the ADA.  There, after a deaf woman was 
denied admission into a federally-funded nursing program, the 
Court was asked to decide whether § 504 prohibited physical 
requirements in admission to professional schools.  Id. at 400.  
In concluding that § 504 did not forbid such requirements, the 
Court held that the woman, who could not understand aural 
communication without reading lips, was not "otherwise qualified" 
for admission to the program because "[a]n otherwise qualified 
person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements 
  
in spite of his handicap."  Id. at 406.   In then examining 
the physical requirements to determine whether modifications had 
to be made so that no discrimination against handicapped 
individuals occurred, the Court concluded that no elimination of 
requirements was necessary because to do so would fundamentally 
alter the program, something not required under the 
Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 408, 409 n.9.   
 Interpreting the Court's decision in Southeastern 
Community College, we stated in Strathie v. Department of 
Transportation, 716 F.2d 277, 231 (3d Cir. 1983): 
 A handicapped individual who cannot meet all 
of a program's requirements is not otherwise 
qualified if there is a factual basis in the 
record reasonably demonstrating that 
accommodating that individual would require 
either a modification of the essential nature 
of the program, or impose an undue burden on 
the recipient of federal funds. 
 
It follows, of course, that if there is no factual basis in the 
record demonstrating that accommodating the individual would 
require a fundamental modification or an undue burden, then the 
handicapped person is otherwise qualified and refusal to waive 
the requirement is discriminatory.  Therefore, when determining 
whether a program discriminates, a court must determine two 
things:  (1) whether the plaintiff meets the program's stated 
requirements in spite of his/her handicap, and (2) whether a 
reasonable accommodation could allow the handicapped person to 
receive the program's essential benefits.  Further, when 
determining an accommodation would allow the applicant to receive 
the benefit, a court cannot rely solely on the stated benefits 
  
because programs may attempt to define the benefit in a way that 
"effectively denies otherwise handicapped individuals the 
meaningful access to which they are entitled . . . ."  Alexander 
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1984). 
 The district court reviewed this case law and concluded 
that if mental alertness is not necessary, "then these plaintiffs 
are qualified to receive the service despite their lack of mental 
alertness."  The district court's statement, therefore, can only 
be interpreted to mean that unless removing the mental alertness 
criteria would be an unreasonable accommodation, i.e., "would 
require either a modification of the essential nature of the 
program, or impose an undue burden on the recipient of federal 
funds," the State would have to drop the requirement.  
Consequently, the dominant issue presented here is whether mental 
alertness is part of the essential nature of the program.  See 
Alexander, 469 U.S. at 287 n.19.  If mental alertness is not part 
of the program's essential nature, the plaintiffs are qualified 
and the State is required to accommodate them.  Likewise, if 
mental alertness is not part of the program's essential nature, 
the accommodation is, by definition, reasonable. 
 The PDPW Manual asserts that the purpose of the program 
is "to allow the physically disabled to live in the least 
restrictive environment as independently as possible, to remain 
in their homes and prevent inappropriate institutionalization, 
and to seek and/or maintain employment."  The district court 
noted that an analysis of the "service[s] actually being offered" 
is necessary to determine the essential nature of the program, 
  
slip op. at 11-12, but seemed to forego that examination and 
instead relied merely on the foregoing excerpt of the program 
manual.  Consequently, it determined that providing these stated 
benefits was the essential nature of the program, and held that 
any physically disabled person whose disability did not prevent 
them from receiving these benefits was qualified. 
 In so holding, the court rejected the State's claim 
that consumer control was part of the essential nature of the 
program requiring mental alertness as an eligibility criterion.  
The court found that consumer control merely provided the State 
with an opportunity to service the recipients, and that the State 
had not proven it was "necessary for the services to be provided, 
or for the benefits to be received."  Id. at 20.  As evidence 
that consumer control is unnecessary to receive the essential 
benefits of the program, the court cited the agency model of care 
in which "mentally alert individuals are fully empowered to 
relinquish consumer control."  Id. at 21.  In essence, the court 
reasoned that if the consumer does not need the ability to hire, 
fire, and supervise an attendant under each mode of care, then 
mental alertness cannot be essential to participation in the 
program. 
 An examination of the actual services offered 
demonstrates that personal control is essential to the program, 
and that mental alertness is a necessary requirement for receipt 
of the program's essential benefit rather than merely a service 
to benefit recipients.  The record indicates that contrary to the 
court's characterization of the agency model, program 
  
beneficiaries do not relinquish personal control in any of the 
attendant care models.  Paula Jean Howley, supervisor for PDPW 
Attendant Care Programs, testified at trial how the consumer 
retains personal control under the agency model.  The purpose of 
the program has as its well-defined goal the provision of greater 
personal control and independence for the physically disabled.  
To achieve the programmatic goal, the physically disabled 
obviously cannot function independently and exercise personal 
control of their lives if they are not mentally alert.  Hence, 
the joinder of this requirement cannot be attributable to 
discrimination, rather, it is "necessary for the provision of the 
. . . program or activity being offered."   
 The argument submitted by Easley and Howard and adopted 
by the district court mischaracterizes the Attendant Care 
Program.  The State intended that the delivery of services to the 
physically disabled preserve their independence, recognizing that 
without their physical limitations, they would be running their 
own lives.  The district court's definition of living 
independently as "the opportunity to remain in the community or 
family home rather than an institution" is drastically different 
than the definition of the creators of the program.  The 
difference is obvious when one considers that the third purpose 
of the program is to enable the physically disabled to seek and 
maintain employment.  The State strives for a level of 
independence that allows an individual to become an active, 
contributing member of society, a level of independence obviously 
greater than one which does nothing more than keep and sustain 
  
persons out of institutions.  Mental alertness of the physically 
disabled who participate in the program is an essential dimension 
without which the objectives of the program cannot be realized.   
  The goals intended to elevate the lives of the 
physically disabled bear some resemblance to the State's earlier 
goals to alleviate the lot of another class of handicapped, the 
mentally disabled and retarded, when it enacted the comprehensive 
Mental Health and Retardation Act in 1966, 50 P.S. § 4102 et seq.  
This legislation endeavored to deinstitutionalize, insofar as 
possible, the State's mental health and retardation centers and 
set up whenever possible County Mental Health and Retardation 
Boards with programs at the county and community levels.  The 
Care Act is another progressive program by the State to improve 
the lot and lives of many physically disabled by providing 
opportunities for personal independence and employment.  See 
Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343, 
1353-54 (10th Cir. 1987) (Rehabilitation Act was intended to 
serve as a helping hand and not "as a 'sword' with which the 
handicapped may carve a share from every federal benefit 
program"). 
 Final support for our view is an independent evaluation 
of the program conducted in 1985 and 1986 by The Conservation 
Company and The Human Organization Science Institute, Villanova 
University, at the behest of the PDPW.  As the report 
demonstrates, Pennsylvania's Attendant Care legislation followed 
a number of similar programs adopted by other states.  
Associations of handicapped persons (e.g., United Cerebral Palsy, 
  
Disabled in Action, Pennsylvania Alliance of Physically 
Handicapped) actively urged legislators to begin attendant care.  
A Final Report of an Evaluation of the Pennsylvania Attendant 
Care Demonstration Program, Vol. 1, p.5.  The report also 
observes that the role of attendants differs from that of 
traditional aides or homemakers.  Under this program, the 
attendant is directed by the handicapped individual and performs 
a wide range of tasks for the physically disabled person.  This 
enables physically disabled persons to  
 better control their lives and reach maximum 
independence when they are able to direct 
their own personal care and manage their 
home, business, and social lives.  Attendant 
Care in Pennsylvania continues to be seen as 
part of the wider independent living movement 
whose fundamental goals are to enable the 
physically disabled to:  a) maintain a less 
restrictive and/or independent living 
arrangement; b) maintain employment; and/or 
c) remain in their homes.   
 
Id. at 4.  These concerns were later incorporated in the policy 
declaration of the Care Act, cited by the State in support of its 
position.  62 P.S. § 3052(3), see page 5 supra.    
 An important part of Easley and Howard's argument that 
mental alertness is not a necessary prerequisite to receiving 
attendant care services is based on their analogy between the use 
of surrogates by consumers and clients who use the "agency" or 
"combination" models offered by the program.  This comparison 
both overstates the control Easley and Howard exercise over their 
own lives and understates the role of the clients in the agency 
and combination models of service delivery.  In the agency model, 
  
the consumer must supervise the attendant and the service plan 
and may reject the attendant at any time.  In the combination 
model, the consumer must designate tasks he/she will perform and 
assign tasks to the agency.  All three models require, at the 
very least, that the consumer make a decision as to the best form 
of service delivery.  The choice of any service model is very 
different from a surrogate making the decision for the consumer.  
Allowing a decision by a surrogate is at complete odds with the 
program objectives. 
 Accordingly, we hold that mental alertness is a 
necessary prerequisite to participation in the attendant care 
program.  Although we appreciate the contentions by the 
plaintiffs of the benefits Easley and Howard could derive from 
this program, this unfortunately is insufficient to carry out the 
purposes sought to be accomplished by the legislature.  Again, 
the Care Act's policy declaration and the Independent Report to 
PDPW explain that the essential nature of the program is to 
foster independence through consumer control for individuals who, 
but for their physical disabilities, could manage their own 
lives, achieve independence, and perhaps obtain employment.  As 
such, mental alertness of the participants is a prerequisite. 
    This does not end the matter, however, as we must 
determine whether the use of surrogates as decision-makers for 
non-mentally alert consumers is a reasonable modification under 
the Care Act. 
B.  Reasonable Modifications Under the Care Act 
  
 The reasonable modification provision of the 
regulations implementing the ADA requires: 
 A public entity shall make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures when the modifications are 
necessary to avoid discrimination on the 
basis of disability, unless the public entity 
can demonstrate that making the modifications 
would  fundamentally alter the nature of the 
services, program, or activity.  
 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(7).  Easley and Howard argue that even if 
mental alertness is an essential prerequisite to receiving 
attendant care services, they could satisfy this prerequisite by 
the use of surrogates.  They claim that the failure to allow this 
reasonable modification violates the ADA and the regulations 
implementing the Act.  The State, on the other hand, takes the 
position that the modification requested by the plaintiffs is 
unreasonable, and is not required under the regulations 
implementing the ADA.   
 The test to determine the reasonableness of a 
modification is whether it alters the essential nature of the 
program or imposes an undue burden or hardship in light of the 
overall program.  School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 
273, 287 n. 17 (1987); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 
(1985); Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 
1368, 1384-86 (3d Cir. 1991).  An analysis of the proposed 
modification leads us to conclude that Easley and Howard's 
suggested modification, the use of surrogates, would, at the very 
least, change the entire focus of the program.  The focus 
fundamentally would shift from the provision of attendant care 
  
and its societal objectives for the physically disabled to 
personal care services to the many thousands of physically 
disabled who are often served by other specially designed state 
programs.  The proposed alteration would create a program that 
the State never envisioned when it enacted the Care Act.  The 
modification would create an undue and perhaps impossible burden 
on the State, possibly jeopardizing the whole program, by forcing 
it to provide attendant care services to all physically disabled 
individuals, whether or not mentally alert.  We therefore hold 
that the use of surrogates would be an unreasonable modification 
of the attendant care program under the Act. 
 C. The Care Act and the ADA. 
 The district court agreed with Easley and Howard's 
interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(c) that physically 
handicapped persons cannot be rendered ineligible for the program 
because they also are afflicted with a mental disability that 
leaves them mentally unalert.  To support its analysis the 
district court cited the regulations implementing Title III of 
the ADA which distinguish between offering services to one class 
of persons with disabilities and barring a person with the same 
needs because the individual has another disability.  The 
regulation states in part: 
 A health care provider may refer an 
individual with a disability to another 
provider, if that individual is seeking . . .  
services outside of the referring provider's 
area of specialization, and if the  referring 
provider would make a similar referral for an 
individual without a disability who seeks or 
requires the same treatment or services.   
 
  
28 C.F.R. § 36.302(b)(2). 
 The plaintiffs acknowledge that the State may lawfully 
provide an attendant care program serving individuals with a 
certain handicap, but assert that the State discriminated against 
them because they have an additional handicap.  As discussed 
earlier in this opinion, the Care Act does not discriminate 
against the mentally disabled; it focuses on a different class of 
handicapped.  The language of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, 
the Independent Report to the PDPW, and the regulations 
implementing the acts contemplate and point to specific classes 
of disabled.  The State emphasizes the power of government to 
design a program for a particular class of handicapped.  As an 
illustration, it cites the Randolph-Sheppard Act, which provides 
vending licenses to blind persons.  20 U.S.C. 107(a) (1990).  
There are other programs offered by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, e.g., the Comprehensive Mental Health and 
Retardation Act to which we have alluded, a program for the deaf 
and hearing impaired, 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 1463 et seq., and a program 
for the care and treatment of persons suffering from chronic 
renal diseases, 35 Pa. C.S.A. § 6201 et seq. 
 Our reading of the Care Act is not inconsistent with 
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.  The regulations implementing 
these acts contemplate reaching groups of disabled without 
incurring obligations to other groups of handicapped.  Cases 
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have stated that their main 
thrust is to assure handicapped individuals receive the same 
  
benefits as the non-handicapped.  The Supreme Court in Traynor v. 
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1987), declared "[t]here is nothing 
in the Rehabilitation Act that requires any benefit extended to 
one category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other 
categories of handicapped persons."       
 The State has not rejected Easley and Howard from the 
program because, mentally unalert, they are unworthy of help; the 
State merely distinguishes this program established by the Care 
Act from a program providing assistance to the non-mentally alert 
physically disabled.  This is not a case of State discrimination 
against a subgroup of the group of people who are physically 
disabled.  On the contrary, this is a case where an additional 
handicap, a severe degree of mental disability, renders 
participation in the program ineffectual. 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 We therefore hold that the Pennsylvania Attendant Care 
Services Act which requires that qualified persons be not only 
physically handicapped but also mentally alert does not violate 
the ADA's non-discriminatory purposes.  We further hold that the 
use of surrogates by the non-mentally alert physically disabled 
is not a reasonable modification of the Pennsylvania Attendant 
Care Services Act.     
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
reversed.  Each side to bear its own costs. 
 
